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A NATIONALIZATION COMPENSATION FRAMEWORK IN THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
Emily Carasco

I. CERDS AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY
A. Background to Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
The proposition that a State has a responsibility when it takes over
an alien's property to compensate the alien according to international
standards has almost always been a controversial one. 1 This is due
largely to the fact that the two major groups, the capital exporting
states (CES) and the capital importing states (CIS) have consistently
maintained different 2ositions as to what, if any, international law
existed in this area.z
Today, when the property taken over is related to natural resources,
the taking is usually part of an attempt to reorganize and restructure a
developing State's economy. 3 If the party deprived of the property is
a powerful foreign economic institution whose interests do not
necessarily coincide with the best interests of the host State, the
matter is no longer one simply concerned with property deprivation. 4
It becomes inextricably tied to issues of economic development in the
taking-over State. In 1974, in recognition of this problem, an
overwhelming majority of United Nations member States adopted the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS)5 as part of the
Declaration on a New International Economic Order. Art. 2 of CERDS
asserted, in part, a State's full permanent sovereignty over its natural
resources and its right to regulate foreign investment within its
territory and to ensure compliance with its social and economic
policies.6
In direct contradiction to traditional international law regarding
state responsibility, Art. 2 of CERDS further declared that should a
State exercise its sovereign right to nationalize the property of foreign
owners, appropriate compensation should be paid by the nationalizing
State and that settlement of any controversy arising from compensation of
such property should be limited to the domestic law of the nationalizing
State. 7 Although the adoption of these CERDS provisions was considered
dramatic and although the reaction to them was strong and vociferous,
dissatisfaction with the traditional international rules of state
responsibility was discernable soon after World War II.8
The contents of Art. 2 of CERDS indicate that the issues pertaining
to nationalization of natural resources industries are inextricably tied
in with the economic development of the nationalizing State. 9
The
adoption of Art. 2 raises certain questions. Is Art. 2 to be given the
same weight as a treaty provision; i.e., is it new law on the issues in
question? What weight, if any, is to be given to the traditional rules
of state responsibility? There is no general agreement on what exactly
constitutes sources of international law, still less on how and when old
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law "dies." The extreme CES position is that the traditional rules of
state responsibility still stand and that CERDS has in no way changed the
situation.1 0 The extreme CIS position is that CERDS has abolished the
traditional rules of state responsibility and has provided new law on the
subject.11

B. Legal Significance of CERDS
CERDS is a General Assembly resolution and as such, is regarded by
most scholars and the International Court of Justice as not legally
12
It
binding upon member States, but not without legal significance.
should be noted too, that when dealing with vital issues that demanded
immediate action, the General Assembly has been known to act beyond the
capacities its creators anticipated. 1 ' The role of the General
Assembly has taken on increasing importance in the United Nations over
14
the years.
The substance of the debates preceding the adoption of CERDS and the
fact that CERDS was part of the Declaration of the New International
Economic Order which was intended "to correct inequalities and redress
existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap
between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily
accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice
...,,15 leads to the conclusion that to the CIS at least, CERDS was
dealing with vital issues. The Declaration was adopted by the General
Assembly without a vote. Paragraph 4 of the Declaration stated in part:
In order to safeguard these natural resources, each
State is entitled to exercise effective control over
them and their exploitation with means suitable to its
own situation including the right to nationalization
or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this right
being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty
of the State.16
The Declaration thus adds weight to the legal significance of CERDS.
CERDS provisions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources and
nationalization not only followed the Declaration adopted without a vote
but was itself adopted by a large majority of General Assembly votes.
This, in addition to the fact that CERDS followed a series of General
Assembly resolutions on the same subject, makes it difficult and
shortsighted to dismiss it as a mere General Assembly resolution with
little or no significance. 1 7
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
makes no mention of General Assembly resolutions as a source of
international law. 1 8 At the time of the drafting of Article 38, it
could not have been anticipated that the General Assembly would some day
be almost fully representative of the international community or that it
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issues. A prominent United States international lawyer and frequent
representative at the United Nations has said of the General Assembly:
"[Only the General Assembly comes near to that ideal of a representative
body of the entire globe. The General Assembly does have the capability
for the true expression of that perfect consensus or nearly perfect
consensus of all mankind."'1 9
One of the arguments used to diminish the legal value of CERDS, is
the fact that six "significant" States voted against the resolution and
ten abstained. 2 0 As the six States are wealthy capital exporting
states who are likely to be most affected by a change in the traditional
rules of state responsibility, this argument cannot be lightly
dismissed. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the States that stood
to gain the most from the traditional rules would willingly go along with
a drastic change, and thus it would be unrealistic to expect the CIS to
wait until such time as they could achieve complete consensus for
change. As it was, a vote of 120 in favour of CERDS out of a total of
136 is a substantial and "significant" majority. 2 1 A point to ponder
is: at what point in time do a series of General Assembly resolutions
adopted by a large majority reflect "consensus"? How much significance
should be given to the consistently negative vote of a small minority
especially when that minority stands to benefit from the status quo? The
sponsors of CERDS, the group of 77, had originally intended that the
Charter be a legally binding instrument. Representatives of several
western countries expressed doubts both as to the feasibility and
advisability of this. 2 2 Eventually, in the interests of achieving
consensus, the representative of Mexico, "in apparent recognition of the
fact that the Charter was no longer intended necessarily to be a legally
binding instrument," introduced revisions whereby the words "to codify
and develop rules for" in the fourth preambular paragraph were replaced
by the words "to promote." 2 3 It would appear then, that there was both
intention and awareness of the non-binding nature of the Charter.
Perhaps the strongest argument against the view that CERDS is binding on
its own and has therefore negated the traditional rules of state
responsibility is that the subject is important enough that any desired
change must be brought about in a very clear and explicit manner. For
CERDS to be binding there should be a greater consensus than was achieved
as to 1) the intention to be bound by the document bringing about the
change and 2) the acceptance of the change by the "significant" States
most likely to be affected by the change.
The discussion above leads to the conclusion that CERDS on its own
is not binding on Member States of the United Nations nor has it
abolished in one sweep the application of the traditional state
responsibility rules for all States. CERDS must, however, be given
considerable weight as a legal document expressing the views of a major
part of the international community. The sections which were
specifically voted against by certain States cannot be held binding upon
them. For those States who strongly supported Art. 2, CERDS on its own
provides, at the very least, evidence of an intention to treat issues of
nationalization in the manner described in Art. 2. It is in fact quite
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possible that some of these States may "express the position in their
municipal courts and possibly elsewhere that the Charter actually
reflects a new standard of international law."'24
As between a State that voted against Art. 2 and one that voted in
favour of it, the situation is more complex. In a nationalization
dispute involving two such States, to merely state that Art. 2 is not
applicable and only expresses a hope of legal norms for the future, is to
dismiss too lightly the hard earned fruits of CERDS. A recent arbitral
award did just that. Discussing the principles expressed in Art. 2 of
CERDS, the sole arbitrator in the oil nationalization dispute, Texaco
Overseas Petroleum Company/ California Asiatic Oil Company and the
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (hereinafter referred to as
Texaco), said that the principles expressed in CERDS, have "nothing more
than a de le e ferenda value only in the eyes of the States which have
adopted t-hem, [and] as far as the others are concerned, the rejection of
these same principles implies that they consider them as being contra

. ,,e25
If Art. 2 of CERDS can be said to have no more than de e .ferenda
value, can it be said that as between a CIS that voted in'avour of Art.
2 and a CES that voted against it, the traditional rules of state
responsibility still apply? If provisions of Art. 2 cannot be said to be
binding upon such a CES, can it be said to be binding upon the equally
"significant" CIS that rejected these rules by voting in favour of Art. 2
? The fact remains that CERDS was not just one solitary act of rebellion
against the traditional rules. It was rather, the final act of rejection
in a long drawn resistance to the application of the traditional rules
and therefore it is questionable whether or not the latter can any longer
be applied to the CIS who voted in favour of CERDS. 2 6 There is adequate
evidence of the fact that the traditional rules of state responsibility
had never been acceptable to the CIS. Some important judicial decisions
have taken note of the reluctance and sometimes refusal of CIS to hold
themselves bound by the traditional rules of state responsibility. 2 7
A further indication of the uncertain state of the law in the area
(and an indirect acknowledgment of CES awareness of the non-universality
of state responsibility rules) is the establishment of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation treaties between States. These bilateral
treaties sought, among other things, to protect investments and generally
provided for fair and equitable mutual treatment of nationals. Some
treaties had specific provisions regarding nationalization and the
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation in the event this
should take place. 2 8 This attempt to promote the use of the
traditional rules of state responsibility through bilateral dealings
with states has not proved very successful between CES and CIS. Very
few CIS are party to such treaties. 2 9
The United States Investment Guaranty Program, which is now under
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), insures American
investors going abroad against risks including expropriation. While the
primary goal of the program was to spur American investment abroad, the
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American investors (and the U.S. Government) are aware of the fact that
belief in the prompt, adequate and effective compensation rules is not
universal.
Not the least significant of the factors indicating the CIS attitude
towards the rules of state responsibility is the undeniable failure to
have these rules successfully codified. 0
The seemingly endless
debate about the applicability of the traditional rules of state
responsibility which intensified after the Second World War, proves one
thing if nothing else -- there is no agreement on the subject. Professor
Baxter's observation is most apt: "The problem with the law of state
responsibility is that its motion stopped several decades ago.,,31
Viewed against a background of numerous indication of non-acceptance by
the CIS of the rules of state responsibility and of indications of the
awareness of this on the part of the CES, CERDS appears as a final and
concerted move to state clearly that the rules of state responsibility
cannot be applied to nationalizations in the traditional manner. CERDS
on its own does not make new law on the subject, but at least for the
CIS, it "unmade" the archaic rules of state responsibility.3 2 From a
CIS viewpoint, the fact that the traditional rules of state
responsibility had been defended by most CES for over a hundred years
does not necessarily give them any legal value, still less moral value.

C. Analysis of Recent Nationalizations Involving
Natural Resources Industries
An analysis of recent nationalizations involving natural resource
industries revealed some interesting features. 3 3 The reasons for the
nationalizations varied and were sometimes difficult to extricate from
the political rhetoric that accompanied the announcement of the
nationalization. Whether the alleged reason was retaliation for U.S.
Mid-East policies 34 a desire to control a vital source of foreign
exchange and GNP,15 or a need to redeem national pride and dignity, 3 6
it was clear that each reason fell within the realm of economic
development. 3 7 The nations involved clearly deemed the decision to
nationalize to be an exercise of national sovereignty. In all instances,
the dispute, if any, centered on the issue of compensation. The right of
the State to nationalize was not questioned.3 8
In all the nationalizations studied, except for the Peruvian
nationalization of IPC, 3 9 the nationalizing Government paid some
compensation to the nationalized corporations. In none of these
instances could it be said that the compensation paid was clearly made in
conformity with an international obligation to pay compensation. 4 0
Practice has confirmed the right to nationalize, but it confirms neither
the CES position requiring full compensation nor the CIS position that
compensation is an internal matter.
In spite of strongly expressed opposition by the CIS to the
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acceptance of an international obligation to pay compensation, it is
submitted that, understandable as such opposition was given the history
of the issue, it is now time to abandon this opposition. Continued
opposition is, in the long run, contrary to the interests of the CIS.
Resources and energies directed towards rejecting an international norm
regarding compensation would be more fruitfully employed in the
formulation of international standards acceptable to both the CIS and the
CES.

II. IN SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF COMPENSATION
A. Equity Arguments to Support International Standards
Arguments to support the need for international standards for
compensation may be divided into two categories -- those based on equity
and those based on a pragmatism which would include recognition of the
fact that the issue has become internationalized. Of primary concern in
the first category are the manifold dangers of arbitrariness in decisions
regarding compensation if no international standards exists. A situation
in which one party to a dispute unilaterally decides the outcome of the
dispute with no possibility of that decision being objectively reviewed
is naturally abhorrent to advocates of the rule of law. 4 1 In such a
situation, the hypothesis presented by the Cuban representative to the
General Assembly in which a State may decide to pay no compensation at
all for nationalized property is not an unlikely possibility. 4 2 Except
in extreme and rare circumstances such a nationalization would be nothing
more than a confiscation.
The trend towards subjectively-based and selective deductions from
compensation as exemplified by Chile 4 3 has its own dangers. Unlimited
and undefined deductions could lead to a situation of no compensation
even if the letter of the municipal law which provides for compensation
is strictly adhered to. Furthermore, shareholders of a nationalized
corporation could be placed in a position where they bear losses arising
from matters far removed from the economic or legal activities of the
44
nationalized corporation.

B.

Pragmatic Arguments to Support International Standards

The pragmatic reasons from a CIS viewpoint for international
standards for compensation are many. Foreign investment is still
desirable and necessary to most CIS and is actively encouraged. In the
CERD's debates, the Jordan representative realistically stated that a
reasonable balance should be maintained between the overriding
consideration of sovereignty, national independence and welfare of
states, particularly developing states, on one side, and the pragmatic
consideration of encouragement of foreign investment on the other. 4 5
The existence of international standards would also help ensure that
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negotiation process or other aspects of compensation disputes. It may
well be that internal pressures from various factions of the Chilean
society prevented the late President Allende from arriving at a
negotiated settlement with the nationalized copper companies, and thus
46
changed the course of Chilean history.
International political pressures on a nationalizing State come in
many forms. Apart from open threats to suspend aid, more indirect means
of exerting pressure have been exercised. 4 7 As suspension of aid and
other economic pressures may disrupt the national economy and destroy any
possible progress in economic development gained by the nationalization,
it would be to the advantage of a nationalizing CIS to have the issue of
compensation freed from such pressures. The chaos and uncertainties
surrounding the issue of compensation has led uncompensated nationalized
enterprises to use whatever means are available to them to gain
possession of products they regard as their own and which third parties
48
have obtained from the nationalizing State.
Speedy settlement of compensation disputes or even just the
knowledge that settlement was in the process within an international
framework, would eliminate the waste of resources spent on law suits
disputing ownership of hot products, enable the nationalizing State to
carry on the business of the nationalized enterprise and presumably reap
the benefits anticipated by the nationalization. Reluctance by foreign
companies, wary of law suits, to purchase ore from Marcona cost Peru a
loss of $8 million a month in foreign exchange. 4 9 Both Libya and Iraq
received strong support from OPEC for their respective oil
nationalizations. 5u However, not all the commodity-producing
developing countries are in a position to call upon OPEC-like power, and
a united effort to have their views be part of an international framework
for compensation would be more beneficial to them than isolated or
solitary attempts to ward off international pressures.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument of self-interest to support the
need for international agreement on compensation issues is the fact that
a number of the so-called developing countries are joining the ranks of
the capital exporting states. The oil producing states are the most
obvious of the new exporters of capital. The unexpected and
unprecedented new wealth of the oil producing nations has led to long
range planning on the part of these nations in order to obtain the
maximum benefit from their new found wealth. Investments abroad are part
of this planning, and concern about possible nationalization of these
51
foreign investments inevitably follows.

C.

Internationalization of the Compensation Issue

Internationalization of the issue of compensation for nationalized
property is the term used to describe the fact that despite assertions to
the contrary, the issue of compensation for nationalized property is no
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longer (if, indeed it ever was) the sole concern of the nationalized
corporation and its host State. The internationalization is brought
about by the concern, interest and involvement of States other than that
of the host States, the actions of host States, and those of
transnational corporations and international institutions.
The United States, a capital exporting state whose 1976 assets of
direct foreign investment was $132.7 billion, has indicated its concern,
interest and involvement in the compensation controversy in a number of
ways. 5 2 The much-flaunted but not-much-used Hickenlooper Amendment to
the Foreign Assistance Act 53 is one example of the concern and possible
involvement of the U.S. Government in compensation disputes which affect
U.S. nationals. U.S. relations with the nationalizing State could also
be affected if the U.S. Trade Act provisions regarding compensation for
nationalized property are involved. 5 4 A third piece of restrictive
legislation that can be invoked by the U.S. against a nationalizing State
in the event of non-payment of adequate compensation is the Gonzalez
55
amendment of the Inter-American Development Bank Act.
The U.S. has a direct interest in the financial settlement over
nationalized property because of the treatment of expropriated property
under U.S. tax laws. It may also be argued that the U.S. Government has
an interest in compensation for nationalized property in that
compensation proceeds, as much as repatriated foreign earnings, are part
of the patrimony of the United States. 5 6 Vattel's well-known thesis,
"Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, which must
protect that citizen, 5 7 may well be applied not to the "injury" to the
property but to the injury in not paying compensation to the foreign
investor. Finally, there is the argument that United States foreign
investors who pay taxes to the United States Government are entitled as
citizens to have their interests protected at home as well as abroad.
The United Nations is one international organization that has had a
history of dealing with nationalization/compensation issues which is
almost as old as the institution itself. The International Law
Commission, the General Assembly, and UNCTAD have all discussed, debated
and proposed solutions to the compensation issue. 5 8 U.N. adoption of
CERDS, which in Article 2 provides that each State has the right to
regulate and supervise the activities of TNCs (transnational
corporation), undoubtedly contributed to the CTNC's (Center for
Transnational Corporations) concerted effort to formulate a Code of
Conduct for TNCs.5 9 Ironically, CERDS may have thus paved the way to
returning the issues of nationalization/compensation to an international
level. The tentative formulation for the Code includes a clause on
nationalization/compensation and if the Code is made binding both on TNCs
and States (as desired by the CES), breach of the Code's provisions for
compensation could give States the right (CERDS notwithstanding) to
60
international claims.
One other international institution that has played a role in the
internationalization of the nationalization/compensation issue is the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
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agreements between CES and CIS dealing with encouragement and protection
of investment had provisions relating to the utilization of ICSID for
dispute settlement. During the CERDS debates, the Singapore
representative stated expressly that even though Singapore voted in
favour of the Charter, it would adhere faithfully to bilateral and
multilateral treaties and to the Convention on the Settlement of Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States in its regulation of foreign
investment.
The transnational corporations have played a role in the
internationalization of the compensation issue. One clear illustration
of this is the deliberate strategy employed by Kennecott Corporation in
Chile to ensure that in the event of nationalization, it would have
lined up as many as possible "international supporters who would
automatically share the Kennecott parent's outrage." 6 2 There is
evidence that the practice of spreading risk and insuring international
response as well as the practice of obtaining guarantees for the amount
of the investment to enable a nationalized corporation to bring suits
against third parties involved with disputed nationalized property is
increasing.63
Some host States' actions have been another factor pointing towards
the proposition that settlement of compensation disputes concerns more
than just the host country and the foreign investor. The highly
successful negotiations over compensation arising from Peru's
nationalization of the Marcona Company and the (less successful)
negotiations regarding Venezuela's nationalization of its oil industry
are examples of this. 4 Despite the provisions of Art. 2(l) of CERDS,
which provides for internal settlement of compensation disputes, and
notwithstanding a Calvo clause in the constitutions of both states, 6 5
these two major post-CERDS compensation settlements were brought about
with the direct assistance of the national State (United States) of the
nationalized corporations. 6 6 These settlements may be regarded as a
positive indication in Latin America of "a tip-toeing away from Calvo and
its strict insistence that nationalization is the exclusive concern of
the host countries" and thus adding to evidence of the
internationalization of the issue. 7
One further acknowledgement of recognition by some CIS that the
issue of compensation is of international significance is the fact that a
number. of these states are party to international investment protection
agreements in which a formula for the computation of compensation for
nationalized property is stipulated. 6 8 Some of these agreements have
been entered into in the post-CERDS era. 6 9
Finally and importantly, at the time of the vote on CERDS, a number
of the CIS stated that they acknowledged an international obligation to
pay compensation for nationalized property and/or an obligation to use
means other than national ones to settle compensation disputes.7 0
While these statements may have been made primarily to reassure foreign
investors, at the very least they are indications of a flexible attitude
towards settlement of compensation issues.
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III.

COMPENSATION FRAMEWORK

The attempt in this paper to create an international framework for
compensation assumes that although the CIS have rejected the traditional
international law standard of adequate compensation, there is agreement
in the international community that it would be both equitable and
pragmatic to establish guidelines for calculation and payment of
compensation and that, except in instances governed by an international
treaty providing otherwise, controversial compensation issues will be
71
determined in the first instance at the national level.

A. Basis of Obligation to Compensate
The standard for compensation and the method of valuation used to a
large extent are dictated by the theory that underlies the obligation to
compensate. In traditional international law, the valid exercise of the
right to nationalize7 2 required that compensation be "adequate" or, as
expressed in the Chorzow case, to be the "just price of what was
expropriated." This has been interpreted as requiring compensation which
would be the equivalent of what the nationalized enterprise might have
fetched in a sale in ideal market conditions prior to the nationalization
and which would return the owner to his pre-nationalization financial
position. 7 3 The net effect of a nationalization was to reduce the
transaction to a forced sale of the enterprise by the private owner to
the nationalizing State with only the interests of the "seller" taken
into consideration. 7 4 In a post World War II nationalization involving
natural resources, usually of vital significance to the economy of the
nationalizing State, this outlook is outdated, unrealistic and
unequitable.
If the term "adequate" is no longer acceptable; 7 5 the term
'appropriate' compensation which is used in the widely supported 1962
General Assembly resolution on natural resources7 6 and also in CERDS,
albeit in a different form, 7 7 is too imprecise to be of assistance in
the actual computation of compensation. This lack of precision follows
from the lack of a clearly defined basis for the obligation to compensate.
What takes place in fact when an enterprise involved in natural
resources is nationalized, is not a sale, hypothetical or otherwise. It
may be described as the unilateral and premature termination of a
contractual relationship between the host State and the nationalized
enterprise which involves, in part, the transfer of property from the
enterprise to the host State. On the basis of its agreement with the
host State, a TNC involved in a natural resources industry usually
proceeds on two levels. While it is growing along what may be called the
horizontal level (e.g., acquiring property, equipment, technology,
etc.), it simultaneously develops what may be called on-going vertical
ties with the government of the host state (e.g., interaction with
regulatory agencies, with customs and tax institutions, etc.), thus
creating a complex and intricate relationship between the two parties. A
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TNC from fulfilling its legitimate expectations based on this
relationship.
Although the relationship thus terminated is almost always a
contractual one, it is submitted that termination by nationalization
cannot be treated as a regular fundamental breach of contract. Because
one party to the contract is a State, it has the legal right and power to
abrogate the contract in the national interests. Nationalization, which
terminates a contractual relationship for the exploitation of natural
resources, thus creates a paradoxical situation where the "breach" of
contract is legal but has detrimental effects requiring a "remedy."
Compensation should not be regarded as an indication of rights
requiring a fixed and rigid standard but as an equitable settlement of
claims following the termination of the host State/nationalized TNC
relationship which takes into account the legitimate expectations and
goals of both parties. Such an outlook allows for settlement of legal
claims in the total context in which they arise. That actual transfer of
property causes losses to the nationalized enterprise thus giving risk to
probable claims is perhaps self-evident. However, the termination of the
contractual relationship between the host State and the nationalized
enterprise could also give to other claims by the nationalized enterprise
and the host State based upon the terminated relationship.
A comprehensive outlook towards nationalization and compensation is
indicated in CERDS Art. 2.2(2), which provides that compensation should
take into account the State's relevant laws and regulations "and all
circumstances that the State considers pertinent."' 8 The United Nations
Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations has taken a similar outlook towards compensation. Although
the Group's discussions thus far have not been formulated in binding
terms, agreement has been reached that in the event of nationalization,
"just compensation should be paid." 7 9 In explaining this tentative
agreement, the Chairman of the Working Group stated: "The adjective
'just' refers to the final outcome of the compensation process rather
than to the particular methods and criteria employed. A just result is
to be sought taking into account all relevant circumstances in each
case.,,8 0
An elaboration of the policy considerations involved in an equitable
resolution of the nationalization/compensation issue is necessary in
order to arrive at appropriate computation guidelines.8 1 For the
nationalizing State an equitable method of compensation computation would
be one that does not defeat the very purpose of a nationalization and
does not prevent the nationalizing state from enjoying the fruits of a
nationalization. However, the nationalizing CIS has an interest in
maintaining a favourable investment climate in order to continue to
attract desirable foreign investment to promote its development process.
This interest as well as the interest in deterring coercive measures by
CES to obtain compensation for the nationalized property of their
nationals must be balanced with nationalization goals.
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From a CES viewpoint, in depriving a nationalized TNC of its
property and terminating its contract for the exploitation of natural
resources, a nationalizing State interferes with the TNC's legitimate
goal of profit making through foreign investment. Equitable compensation
for such interference with the TNC's goals (which has an effect on the
TNC's national State's economy) and some uniformity regarding computation
of compensation are essential for protection of foreign investment and,
from a CES viewpoint, must be taken into consideration in any
compensation framework. The maintenance of a favourable foreign
investment climate is also important to the CES because of its need for
sources of raw materials. It is suggested, then, that the computation
of compensation should utilize guidelines that allow for the legitimate
expectations of both groups to be fulfilled to the extent that one does
not contradict the other. A minimum level of compensation extracted from
the common policy interests of both groups could form the base of a
flexible compensation framework which could accommodate particular
features of each nationalization.
The mutual need for the promotion and continuance of a favourable
foreign investment climate would suggest that, at a minimum, a
nationalized enterprise be compensated for all actual losses suffered as
a result of nationalization. Flexibility is added to the definition of
actual losses by viewing the contractual relationship terminated by
nationalization in the light of the actions of both parties to the
relationships.
The compensation framework being proposed here has two parts, the
first dealing with possible claims by a nationalized TNC and the second
dealing with possible claims by a nationalizing State.

B. Compensation Framework:
(i)

Part One

TNC claims arising out of losses incurred by transfer of
(nationalized) property.

There is general agreement that the raison d'etre of compensation
for private property taken over by a State is the notion that a State
should not take advantage of its right to expropriate at the expense of
private persons. The legitimate expectation on the part of the TNC that
the host State should pay for what it receives as a result of the
transfer is not generally questioned. The nationalized TNC's first claim
then, would be for losses arising as a result of the transfer of
ownership to the host State. The question that arises, then, is how the
transferred property should be valued.
Although the book valuation method 8 2 of nationalized property has
not received universal support as an acceptable measure of the worth of
property, it may be said to represent what is regarded by some CES as the
minimum value of the property and by some CIS as a satisfactory measure
of the value of the property. 8 3 In the case of a natural resources
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enterprise that is nationalized, book value would represent the company's
total expenditure for exploration, development and other capital
investments minus that part of the original investment already recouped
by depreciation, amortization and other tax write-offs.
In order to overcome the major CES objection to the use of book
value compensation, 8 4 and to comply with the demands of equity, book
value must be "updated", i.e., the effects of inflation must be taken
into account. The use of book value for computation of the value of
5
nationalized property is not unknown to U.S. corporations. 8
If updated book value is established as the measure of payment for
the part of the compensation settlement that deals with the property
actually transferred from the nationalized TNC to the host State, the
accounting principles and general practices of TNCs regarding bookkeeping
will have to undergo some changes. The subjective facets of readjustment
must be minimized and agreement as to the methods of doing so will
prevent the problem of books being falsified to represent a higher value
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in anticipation of a nationalization.
(ii)

TNC claims for losses based on 'gains lost' by reliance on
economic development agreements.

Another possible TNC post nationalization claim may be that
termination of its economic development agreement by nationalization not
only caused losses as a result of the transfer of the nationalized
property but also resulted in "gains lost," that is, actual losses
involved in foregoing the opportunity to enter into another contract.
Compensation for these losses may be claimed on the basis that it was in
reliance upon the contract that the TNC entered into the investment and
passed up opportunities for other possible investments. It could be
pointed out that in a credit-conscious economic system, as soon as an
investment is made, its anticipated worth based on the amount invested is
already owned by the investor, and when a nationalization deprives the
investor of this ownership, the investor incurs an actual loss. If
reliance losses are protected only to the extent that compensation is
paid for that property actually transferred to the host State, the
existence of the economic development contract and its terms upon which
the investment was made is, in fact, being ignored. No importance is
attached to commitments made by the host State, and no value is placed on
the terms of the contract. To a TNC considering foreign investment in a
natural resources industry in a CIS, these commitments are of great value
as they are the foundation upon which the investment is based. Given the
present CIS attitude towards natural resources, TNCs would probably not
invest in natural resources in developing countries without protective
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host State commitments.
It is in the interests of the CIS not to discourage investment.
Therefore, a compensation framework disregarding losses claimed as a
result of reliance upon the terms of an economic development agreement
the host State freely entered into, is undesirable. The CIS determinedly
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commitments in Art. 2.2(d) of CERDS, 8 8 but this exclusion does not
eliminate consideration of the role of these commitments in the
computation of compensation for nationalized property. The exclusion of
economic development contract obligations from CERDS was, in any case,
only because the CIS did not want to raise these contracts to the level
of a treaty. An equitable treatment of a foreign investor would demand
consideration of the role of the contract terminated by nationalization.
Although it is uncertain how much CIS consensus is involved in this
clause, the most recent report of the Working Group on the Code of
Conduct for TNCs, on the subject of compensation states:
Fair and equitable treatment of transnational
corporations by the countries in which they operate
includes payment of just compensation in the event of
nationalization ... with full regard to international
obligations and contractual undertakings to which the
States have freely subscribed.d
The measure of losses involved in foregoing the opportunity to enter
into another contract presents some difficulty. In a hypothetical
society in which all values were available on the market and where all
markets were 'perfect' in the economic sense, there would be no
difference between a claimant's loss based on reliance upon a contract
and his loss based on expectations of performance of the contract. In
other words, the claimant's loss in foregoing the opportunity to enter
another contract would be identical with the expectation value of the
contract he did make. 9 0 With an economic development contract,
however, the factors which dictate the terms of a contract and the
circumstances of the investment (by which expectancy may be measured) are
usually peculiar to the investment itself. A comparable market situation
in which exist identical terms which might have been agreed on is
unlikely to exist. The losses of the nationalized TNC as a result of
having foregone an opportunity to enter into another contract may thus
have very little relation to that which the TNC might have received had
the contract it did enter into been performed. The losses could be
either more or less than losses valued by expectancy. Added to this is
the fact that even if a comparable market situation existed, the losses
based on reliance could only be said to be identical to losses based upon
expectation of performance of contract if the latter was an unchanging
factor, and thus it could be said that the prospective profits were
within the reasonable expectations of the TNC. The peculiar
characteristics of investment in natural resources industries in
developing countries rules out reliance that the terms of the economic
development agreement will remain unchanged for the full term of the
contract.91
What exists then, is a situation where compensation is believed
desirable for losses incurred by a nationalized TNC's reliance upon the
host State's contractual commitments but there is no accurate method of
measuring those losses. Those losses could be claimed even if it cannot
be proved that a TNC would have entered into a contract just as
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without the host State's commitments, the TNC would not have entered into
the investment and incurred losses upon nationalization. It is
anticipation of certain minimum profits over invested capital that causes
a TNC to rely on the host State's commitments in a contract and enter
into the investment. The value placed on that reliance may then be said
to be the equivalent of the minimum anticipated annual profits (MAAP).
One implication of this assumption is that the corporation would not have
entered into the investment if in its estimation the return over the
investment would fall below the MAAP. Another implication is that even
in renegotiation of the contract over the course of the investment, the
TNC would not allow its share of the profits in the investment to go
below the MAAP. In other words, the TNC would have reason, based on the
host State's commitment, to count on receiving each year, at the very
least, the MAAP.
On this basis, a possible formula for calculation of the loss
incurred by a nationalized TNC because of reliance placed upon a host
State's contractual commitments could be the minimum anticipated annual
profits over invested capital multipled by the remainder of years left on
the terminated contract. The use of this formula is not limited to
situations where a comparable investment possibility existed at the time
the terminated contract was entered into. MAAP may be calculated solely
on factors relating to a particular investment in its environment. If,
for example, the MAAP of a nationalized investment that had 10 years left
on its contract, had been A%, the compensation for losses based on
reliance would be A% x 10. The total amount arrived at would represent
"gains lost" by the nationalization to which the TNC had legitimate
expectation.
Corporations are not unfamiliar with the concept of estimates of
MAAP or return on investments (ROI). 9 2 Methods for calculating
possible returns on investments range from examination of one or two
characteristics of an investment to sophisticated risk analysis
projections. One method of deciding upon the possibility of recovering
the MAAP is to have some type of rating scale for determining a country's
investment climate. 9 3 A more sophisticated method of risk analysis in
order to estimate ROI is one that takes into account possible changes in
the factors that will affect the project's profitability. 9 4 Methods
like these can be used by TNCs to arrive at an estimate of a cutting-off
point in profits below which the investment would not be worthwhile.
The selection of a rate of MAAP that is satisfactory to both the
host State and the TNC for future contracts should be negotiated prior to
the investment and the formula provided for in the contract as part of
total compensation in the event of nationalization. Obviously, if future
investment is not to be discouraged, the MAAP must be high enough to
provide investors with the incentive to enter into an investment in the
first place. Erring on the side of conservation is recommended, although
how far this is possible at a time when the bargaining power of the TNC
is at its strongest (prior to the investment) is questionable. 9 5
Reasoned calculations of MAAP in particular investments and the ensuing
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custom among parties concerned would, it is hoped, gradually create norms
for categories of industries. Provisions for review of the estimated
MAAP will afford the host State some protection against abuse of the
TNC's strong bargaining position when the MAAP was provided for in the
contract and will allow for the actual profit level of the investment to
provide an equitable MAAP.
The question then arises as to the use of the formula for already
existing contracts repudiated by nationalization. Years after an
investment has been entered into (and presumably successfully or else it
would not have been nationalized) an estimate of MAAP will be somewhat
arbitrary. The profit level of the enterprise, comparable investments,
records of the corporation, a hindsight risk analysis of the factors
involved, etc. will assist in the estimation. The profit level on its
own is not a reliable basis, for a decision as the fact that the TNC had
continued investing in particular enterprises whose recorded profit level
was not very high may have been due to factors relating to other branches
of the TNC. A possible solution to the difficulties involved in
estimating a hindsight MAAP is to select a minimum percentage for the
various categories of industries in each country and leave it to the
parties concerned to negotiate the final figure.
Would provisions for compensation in the event of nationalization
encourage nationalizations? It is not likely that they will, as the
nationalizing State will still have to evaluate the usual political and
economic considerations involved in making the decision to nationalize.
It is even possible that provisions for compensation with specific
formulas will discourage nationalization as the nationalizing State will
be fully aware of the financial burdens it will incur upon
nationalization.
Should the formula be applied to all economic development
contracts? The question should be answered in the affirmative and the
rare occasions in which the formula would be inapplicable should be dealt
with on a case by case basis. An extreme example of such an occasion
would be a case where the economic development agreement had run most of
its course and the TNC involved had reaped profits very much higher than
the MAAP. In the case of very long-term agreements in which only part of
the complete term had expired, a scaling down of MAAP may be provided for
after a certain period. 9 6
One further concession towards the protection of the host State is
necessary. Natural resources industries deal with depletable commodities
which often get to be increasingly costly to exploit. In order to afford
some protection to the nationalizing State at a time when continued
exploitation of the resources may be unprofitable, provisions should be
made for a minimum point of profits level which, if arrived at, will
absolve the nationalizing State of its obligation for reliance losses
compensation. Such a provision is justifiable because if the TNC had
still been operating the enterprise, it would have divested its interests
when exploitation became costly and profits were negligible.
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MAAP is provided for in a contract, the provision should be strictly
adhered to unless there is clear evidence that the agreement was
concluded in circumstances marked by duress or clear inequality between
the parties, or where the conditions upon which such a contract was based
have fundamentally changed, causing unforeseen major distortions in the
relations between the parties and thus rendering the contract unfair or
oppressive to either of the parties. 9 7 TNCs presently involved in
natural resources industries in developing countries would do well to
provide for compensation along the lines suggested. Even with the
existing uncertainty as to the status of economic development agreements,
a clear agreement by a host State as to compensation will not be lightly
set aside by any judicial tribunal.
A distinction must be made here between awarding lucrum cessans
(which would take the compensation to fair market value level and
awarding the TNC the losses of minimum anticipated profits. The latter
are awarded on the basis that without anticipation of this minimum level
of profits for the full term of the contract (anticipation created by the
facts surrounding the investment and the conduct of the host State) the
TNC would not have entered into the investment. The award would be
dependent on the profit level of the enterprise after the
nationalization. Lucrum cessans, on the other hand, is what the TNC
would have earned duringthe full term of the contract if it had not been
changed and not been repudiated -- circumstances that are made
impossible by nationalization. Its amount would depend on the future
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profitability level of the investment.

C. Compensation Framework:
(i)

Part Two

Host State Claims Against Nationalized Enterprise (Deductions).

Although host States in recent nationalizations have made various
deductions from net compensation awarded nationalized enterprise on the
basis of retroactive claims, there has been little public explanation or
justification of the legal basis for such deductions. 9 9 If it is
acknowledged that a nationalization results in the termination of a
complex economic and legal relationship between a TNC and the host State,
it is to be expected that upon termination of the relationship the latter
may have claims against the TNC based upon the relationship prior to its
termination. When a TNC enters into a contractual relationship with a
host State for the exploitation of its natural resources, the host State
can be said to have reasonable expectations that the TNC will conform
with its laws and regulations and will refrain from unjust enrichment at
the expense of the State's national objectives. It is alleged
non-conformity with these expectations that gave rise to the claims that
formed the "deductions" in recent compensation settlements.
TNCs have been put on general notice about CIS' expectations
regarding their activities. Art. 2.2(b) of CERDS states that each State
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has the right to regulate and supervise the activities of transnational
corporations within its national jurisdiction "and to take measures to
ensure that such activities comply with its laws, rules and regulations
and conform with its economic and social policies. '1' 0 0 In stating the
general obligations of TNCs in the most recent report on work on the Code
of Conduct for TNCs, the burden of adherence to economic goals and
development objectives, policies and priorities is shifted more directly
to the TNC:
Consistent with the need to maintain the viability of
their operations, transnational corporations should
take effective measures to ensure that their
activities are compatible with and make a positive
contribution towards the achievement of the economic
goals and established development objectives of the
countries in which they operate.1 0 1
In the compensation framework being recommended, it is anticipated
that the expectations of the host State of a TNC's conformity with its
national goals would be expressed in relevant agreements and contracts
between the host State and the TNC. Equally importantly, specific
examples of what may be considered contrary to a host State's
expectations, should, as far as possible, be made known to TNCs operating
in a host State. Publication of the specific practices and activities of
TNCs which are contrary to the expressed expectations of the host States
and which may give rise to claims during or upon termination of its
relationship with a TNC, will avoid the charge of retroactivity that has
been levelled at claims of this type in recent practices of States. When
the Code of Conduct for TNCs which has isolated undesirable TNC business
practices comes into effect, a clause in every economic development
contract specifying a TNC's obligation to conform with its provisions
would solve this problem. However, the code may be a while in being
adopted, and, furthermore, its legal nature is at this point
unforeseeable.1 0 2
Meanwhile, some States are less able than others to anticipate
undesirable TNC business practices and may not have provided laws for
them prior to nationalization, giving rise to retroactive claims.
Retroactive charges against a TNC may also be brought about with regard
to circumstances that were unforeseeable at the time the contract was
entered into. As the bargaining, economic and commercial skills as well
as the technological knowhow of the developing countries increase,
instances of retroactive claims should naturally decrease. The dangers
involved in retroactive claims would be greatly diminished if they were
permitted only if I) the TNC may reasonably have been aware that its
undesirable activities had detrimental effect on the host State's
objectives and 2) the undesirable activities unjustly enriched the TNC.
It should be noted that for civil purposes, retroactive legislation is
not uncommon and there is "neither hard principle of international law
nor developed consensus of municipal law prohibiting the use. of
10 3
retroactively applied civil rules.'
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within the compensation framework will be discussed here. The subject of
the claims in this category as well as the substance of each claim will
vary greatly according to the history and circumstances of the investment
involved. This discussion therefore is undertaken with a view to
suggesting possible guidelines and attitudes towards settlement of such
claims rather than with the intention of offering clear-cut rules
regarding them.
(a) Profits.
The issue of 'excess profits' as a deduction against compensation
has given rise to much controversy. 1 0 4 Profit maximization being the
primary motivation for investment, it is essential that guidelines for
possible deduction of 'excess-profits' be set up in order to afford some
protection to TNCs. At what point do high profits become
"excess-profits"? The word "excess" has been defined as: "State or fact
of going beyond limits, especially beyond sufficiency, necessity, or
duty; also that which exceeds what is usual, proper, just or
specified.",1 0 5 There is an implication in the definition of 'excess'
of a known standard, making its applicability to the matter of profits
inappropriate in most instances.
The contractual relationship entered into by a TNC and a host State
for the exploitation of its natural resources presupposes that the TNC is
entitled to profits for its risky venture within the terms of the
economic development. Profits that a TNC obtains by unconscionable
actions, i.e. profits that may be said rightly to belong to the host
State, are not part of the legitimate expectations of both parties to the
relationship. These profits may be reclaimed by the host State prior to
or at the time of the termination of its relationship with the TNC by
nationalization. The term "unconscionable profits" with its connotations
of unfairness is preferred over the term "excess-profits" with its
connotations of intemperateness. Basing claims upon the unconscionable
methods used to obtain certain profits rather than upon an undefined
standard of appropriate profits has certain advantages. It leaves each
host State free to seek an equitable resolution of an 'unconscionable
profits' dispute in the light of the TNC's own particular history and the
circumstances surrounding its investment.
Specific claims for 'unconscionable profits' may arise in situations
involving a) unfair contracts, 1 0 6 b) transfer pricing practices
and/or I0 7 c) windfall profits.1 0 8 The strength of these claims will
depend to a large extent on the evidence produced by the host State to
indicate reasonably that the profits rightly belong to the host State. A
standard of reasonableness is admittedly capable of distortion but is not
one unknown to lawyers, judges and arbitrators and its use may be
safeguarded by judicial review. The difficulties of arriving at
objective standards of reasonableness may in this instance lie more in
obtaining information regarding relevant commercial practices than in
deciding upon the standards to be applied.
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A deduction for environmental damage from a compensation award in a
recent nationalization, I 0 9 as well as the inclusion of provisions for
environmental protection in the tentative agreement on the anticipated
Code of Conduct for TNCs suggests yet another category of possible
deductions from compensation. There are no international standards
regarding environmental protection at present and in the absence of such
standards it is likely that TNCs will shop around for low constraint
countries. In order to avoid a situation where the desperation of needy
developing countries turns them into dumping grounds for unscrupulous
TNCs, international environmental rules are essential.
Until then, however, the question is -- to what extent should
environmental damage caused by a TNC be a deduction against compensation
if no standards or extremely low standards for environmental protection
existed in the nationalizing host State? One possible approach is to
hold a TNC responsible for environmental damage that might reasonably
have been anticipated as a consequence of the investment. The decision
as to the level of damage and its reasonable anticpation by the TNC can
be made on the basis of a) any knowledge and information regarding the
possibility of the damage that could be presumed to have been available
to the TNC and b) comparable experiences in other countries.
When (and if) the Code of Conduct for TNCs becomes effective,
decisions as to what damage may reasonably have been anticipated may be
made easier. The present tentative agreement on provision for
environmental protection requires that in addition to complying with
existing laws and in the performance of their activities, protecting and
improving the environment, the TNCs are required to supply all relevant
information concerning:
-features of their products or processes which may
harm the environment and the measures and costs
required to avoid harmful effects;
-prohibitions, restrictions, warnings and other
regulatory measures imposed in other countries, on
grounds of protection of the environment, on products
and processes which they have introduced or intend to
introduce in the countries concerned. 1 10

(c) Other Possible Host State Claims.
The anticipated Code of Conduct for TNCs deals with various issues
Often, though not
that cause tension between TNCs and host States.
necessarily, these are the issues that lead to nationalization. Even if
the Code does not become legally binding on TNCs as an international
obligation, the subject matter of the Code may be incorporated into the
national legislation of host States and may give rise to claims on
violations thereof. These could be claims based on violations of human
rights, balance of payments laws, etc. 1 1 1 As part of a State's
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national legislation, these claims could be brought prior to a
nationalization as well.

D. Compensation Framework:

Part Three

(i) Method and Form of Compensation Payment.
The method and form of payments in a post-CERDS compensation
framework, unlike the traditional requirements of "prompt" and
"effective" payment,1 1 2 must take into account the fact that the
reasons underlying a nationalization in a developing country are often
not unrelated to the country's desire to improve its foreign exchange and
balance of payments situation. To do otherwise would be to ignore the
central significance of Art. 2 as a provision within CERDS -- the fact
that for the CIS, nationalization is one means of advancing their
economic development and redressing some of the imbalance in the present
international economic system.
As CIS generally do not have the means to pay compensation at the
time it is awarded, the source of payment will often be (and rightly so),
the subsequent profits from the nationalized enterprise itself. The
ideal solution would be payment as soon as possible and in the form most
meaningful to the nationalized TNC. Even if this were possible, it would
probably only be at the expense of denying the host State any of the
financial benefits of the nationalization. It would probably mean that
all profits from the enterprise would be directed towards payment of
compensation, thus defeating the purpose of the nationalization. The
method and form of payment of compensation should be ones that will
ensure that the nationalizing State enjoys an adequate flow of the
profits of the nationalized enterprise but will not leave the
nationalized TNC in a position where the amount of the compensation may
be equitable but meaningless due to the form and method of payment.
These goals may be realized more easily in nationalizations of natural
resources industries than perhaps in nationalization of manufacturing
industries because in the former, profits form a high share of the value
of output and because these industries are sometimes in a position to
1 13
control world supply and therefore prices.
Presented below are some suggestions for guidelines in the method
and form of payment for compensation for nationalized enterprises
involved in natural resources industries.
(a) If payment is possible in convertible currency,
it should be made in such form.
(b) Where money paid for compensation can be
repatriated by the TNC without causing balance of
payments problems to the host State, the TNC
should be entitled to transfer such money to any
country of its choice.
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(c) If a host State's balance of payments does not
permit a) or b), the host State may pay part of
the total compensation (perhaps one third)
immediately and the rest of the compensation in
the form of Government bonds bearing a reasonable
rate of interest and redeemable over a reasonable
period.
(d) The annual payment of the principal and interest
must be low enough to permit the anticipated net
profits of the enterprise to cover it and leave a
reasonable flow of profits accruing to the State
for the advancement of its economy. The portion
of the net profits devoted to payment of the
principal and interest in Government bonds should
not exceed a third of the total annual net
profits of the nationalized enterprise.
(e) If the bonds and interest thereon used for the
payment of compensation are redeemable beyond an
eight year period, provisions should be made for
periodic revaluation of the compensation award or
for revaluation at the request of either party to
take into account the effects of inflation and
other factors affecting payment of compensation.
(f) The parties should feel free to arrange for
payment of compensation in the form of the
commodity being exploited.
There can no longer be rigid rules for the method and form of
compensation payment and in the final analysis, each nationalization and
its surrounding circumstances determine both factors.

E. Summary of Sugested Compensation Framework
The comprehensive framework proposed was created with the basic aim
of satisfying what is assumed to be a common goal of the CIS and the CES
-- the promotion of foreign investment compatible with the national goals
of host States in a favourable investment climate. At the same time, the
compensation framework was not intended to penalize the nationalizing
State or even discourage nationalization of natural resources industries
in developing countries. Nationalization as a right (and, to the CIS, an
important development strategy) is regarded as an inevitable occurrence
in the new international economic order. The framework sought to ensure
that the level of compensation and its method and form of payment did not
defeat the purpose of a nationalization. Recognition is also given to
the fact that even if a nationalization is carried out for the primary
purpose of national economic development and the secondary purpose of
altering existing economic power patterns, a nationalized TNC which is an
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economic institution with its own commercial goals (usually in the host
State at its invitation), should not be penalized for existing inequities
in the international economic system and should be held responsible only
for its own detrimental actions in the host State.
Part One of the Compensation Framework deals with "actual losses"
incurred by a TNC as a result of nationalization by termination of its
contract with the host State. Even though it is built at a level that
may be regarded as the minimum compensation for which a host State may be
held responsible, the guidelines suggested allow for enough flexibility
that the final sum arrived at after settlement of the TNC's claims will
be an equitable one in the circumstances of the investment.
Part Two of the Compensation Framework enables a State to reclaim
from a nationalized TNC what may be said rightly to belong to it, that
is, the State. Here too the claims are restricted to actual losses in
that only those losses incurred which the TNC should have been aware of
or from which it unjustly enriched are permitted to be used as a basis
for a deduction claim.
The major flaw of a flexible compensation framework of the kind
recommended is that it leaves much to subjective decision-making. For
example, if MAAP have not been provided for and a TNC is dissatisfied
with the host State's post nationalization estimate, who then decides the
dispute and on what grounds is the decision made? Deductions cause
equally difficult decision-making problems. What is an "unfair
contract"? Where does the decision-maker get the information to make the
necessary decision ? An international dispute-settlement body that is
acceptable to both the CES and the CIS is essential. 1 1 4 It is
nevertheless suggested that the first stage of compensation settlement
should be on a municipal level.
In order to have uniform utilization of a compensation framework of
the kind suggested, it should be in the form of an international
agreement with provisions for incorporation into municipal law.
Uniformity is necessary in order to prevent a situation where some
countries or some regions provide a more "favourable" investment climate
for TNCs because of low constraints on the TNCs or because of a vacuum in
their compensation laws leaving them open to pressures from the more
powerful States.
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CALENDAR OF IMPORTANT EVENTS LEADING TO ADOPTION OF CERD
1930

Hague Conference for Codification of International Law -- The
doctrine of an international standard for compensation was
upheld by a narrow margin, 23-17.

1947-48

U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment held at Havana.
Proposals for an International Trade Organization. The
conference drew up a Charter and many of its provisions
foreshadow the agenda of the 1974 New International Economic
Order. The proposal for an ITO, which was designed to join
the IMF and IBRD in forming the foundation of the post-war
economic order was never ratified by the United States.

1952

A United National General Assembly resolution (G.A. Res. 626)
contained the proposition that "the right of peoples freely to
use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is inherent
in their sovereignty... ."

1955

Largely by the votes of the economically less developed
nations and over the opposition of many western European
States, the General Assembly's Third Committee adopted, for
inclusion as part of Art. 1 in both draft Covenants on Human
Rights, the following language: "All peoples have the right
to self-determination... [and] may freely dispose of their
natural wealth and resources... without prejudice... upon the
principle of mutual benefit."

1955

A group of 29 African and Asian countries met in Bandung at
Indonesia's initiative. This Conference, which the People's
Republic of China attended, was addressed to efforts for
hastening the independence of countries still under colonial
rule; the conference was aimed at shifting away from alliances
with the great powers.

1960

The Asian, African Legal Consultative Committee, with Japan as
the one dissenter, rejected the principle of an "international
standard" for nationalization and drafted a convention that
provides for payment for expropriated property "in accordance
with local laws, regulations and orders."

1961

First U.N. Development Decade.

1962

Second Conference of Non-Aligned Nations held in Cairo.
Recommendation was made to hold an international conference on
trade and development -- precursor to UNCTAD.

1962

G.A. Res. 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources
adopted with 87-2-12 vote. The resolution affirmed the
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and
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international law and the need for good faith observance of
foreign investment agreements.
1964
(March)

First UNCTAD conference held in Geneva. Intellectual "think
tank" for development issues. Also provided a forum for the
emergence of collective action among developing nations.

G.A. Res. 2158 on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources
1966
(November) confirmed that the exploitation of natural resources in each
country shall always be conducted in accordance with its
national laws and regulations.
1970

Third Conference of Non-Aligned Nations held in Lusaka. The
economic dependence of developing countries was discussed and
for the first time the concept of self-reliance was
formulated. The Conference called for a decrease in
dependence on aid from developed countries and the
establishment of an effective strategy for economic, financial
and technological development.

1971

G.A. Res. 2692 on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources
of Developing Countries and Expansion of Domestic Sources of
Accumulation for Economic Development reaffirmed the right of
the peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their
natural wealth and resources, which must be exercised in the
interest of their national development and the well-being of
the people of the State concerned.

1971

Group of 77 formed to defend a common position at UNCTAD
conference at Lima.

1972

A meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned
countries at Georgetown further defined the concept of
self-reliance, and an action programme of economic
co-operation among developing countries was established.

1972
(April)

Ninety-second Plenary Meeting of UNCTAD held in Chile.
President of Mexico, The Honourable Luis Echeverria Alvarez
suggested that the international economy should be placed on a
"firm legal footing" through formulation of a Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States.

1972
(May)

UNCTAD resolved to establish a Working Group to draft the
Charter "to protect duly the rights of all countries and in
particular the developing States.... "

1972
(October)

The Trade and Development Board of UNCTAD adopted Res. 88
which after affirming the principles of permanent sovereignty
over natural resources stated that such measures as States may
adopt in order to recover their natural resources are the
expression of a sovereign power in virtue of which it is for
each State to fix the amount of compensation and that any
dispute arising therefrom falls within its national
jurisdiction.
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Working Group of Charter held its first session in Geneva.
1973
(February)

1973
(Sept.)

Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Nations held in Algiers.
The Economic Declaration of the Algiers Conference of
Non-Aligned Countries included the statement that a State that
carries out a nationalization is entitled to determine the
amount of compensation and any dispute settlement thereof
would be in accordance with the national legislation of the
State.

1973
G.A. Resolution 3171 reaffirmed recognition by the
(December) international community of national sovereignty over natural
resources and supported resolutely the efforts of developing
countries to regain effective control over their natural
resources. The resolution provided in part that the principle
of nationalization carried out by States as an expression of
their sovereignty in order to safeguard their natural
resources, "implies that each State is entitled to determine
the amount of possible compensation, and the mode of payment,
and that any disputes which might arise should be settled in
accordance with the national legislation of each State
carrying out such measure."
1974

(January)

1975

(May)

Permanent Representative of Algeria to the U.N. requested the
Secretary-General to convene a Special Session of the General
Assembly to consider the "Study of the Problems of Raw
Materials and Development."
The General Assembly adopted without a vote Res. 3201,
entitled "Declaration on the New International Economic
Order." The Declaration stated in paragraph 4 that under the
new international economic order, every State enjoyed full
permanent sovereignty over its natural resources and the right
to nationalize these resources in order to safeguard them was
an expression of this full, permanent sovereignty.

The General Assembly by a 120-6-10 vote adopted the Charter of
1974
(December) Economic Rights and Duties of States.

1975
The Declaration of Dakar at the Conference of Developing
(February) Countries on Raw Materials stated that the recovery and
control of natural resources held the key to their economic
freedom.
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CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES
Article I

Article 2
1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent
sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth,
natural resources and economic activities.
2. Each State has the right:
(a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment
within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and
regulations and in conformity with its national objectives and
priorities. No State shall be compelled to grant preferential treatment
to foreign investment;
(b) To regulate and supervise the activities of transnational
corporations within its national jurisdiction and take measures to ensure
that such activities comply with its laws, rules and regulations and
conform with its economic and social policies. Transnational
corporations shall not intervene in the internal affairs of a host
State. Every State should, with full regard for its sovereign rights,
co-operate with other States in the exercise of the right set forth in
this subparagraph;
(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of
foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid
by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant
laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers
pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to
a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the
nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be
sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance
with the principle of free choice of means.
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being undertaken under due process of law, in
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